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Abstract
Herd behavior is often viewed as a significant threat for the stability and efficiency
of financial markets. This paper sheds new light on the relevance of herd behavior
for observed correlation of trades. We introduce numerical simulations of a herd
model to derive theory-guided predictions regarding the impact of various aspects
of uncertainty on herding intensity. We test the predictions using a novel data set
including all real-time transactions of institutional investors in the German stock
market. In light of the model simulations, empirical results strongly suggest that
the observed correlation of trades is mainly due to the common reaction of investors
to new public information and should not be misinterpreted as herd behavior.
Keywords: Herd Behavior, Institutional Trading, Correlated Trading, Model Sim-
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1 Introduction
Correlated trading of institutional investors is a widely discussed empirical phenomenon.
In particular, the rationale behind correlated trading remains an open issue. On the
one hand, correlated trading can occur unintentionally as investors react commonly on
the same public information. On the other hand, correlated trading can be the result of
herd behavior. Herding investors ignore their own noisy information and intentionally
follow other market participants, since they infer from observed trading behavior that
others have relevant information. Therefore, correlated trading induced by herd behav-
ior impedes the informational efficiency of financial markets with possibly destabilizing
consequences, see, e.g., Lee (1998). This paper tries to shed more light on the relevance
of herd behavior for the observed correlation of trades from both a theoretical and an
empirical perspective. In a first step, we perform numerical simulations of a herding
model to derive theory-guided predictions regarding the role of various aspects of un-
certainty for herding intensity. In a second step, the predictions are tested empirically
using a comprehensive data set of the German stock exchange.
Herding models show how herd behavior can arise under certain market conditions that
are characterized by e.g. the precision of private signals, compare Avery and Zemsky
(1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011).1 It is less clear, however, what determines
one market to be more prone to herd behavior than another. For example, in Avery
and Zemsky (1998), even the sign of the effect of more informative signals on herding
intensity depends on the complete model parameterization. The empirical content of
herding models is further complicated by the fact that model parameters cannot be
expected to be constant over time and across stocks.
Empirical herding measures are typically based on the correlation of trades observed
under heterogenous market conditions in a broad range of stocks. In order to capture
1Further conditions discussed in the theoretical literature are e.g. transaction costs (Lee (1998)),
endogenous sequencing of trades (Chari and Kehoe (2004)), and heterogenous risk aversion (De´camps
and Lovo (2006)). Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004) investigate empirically how firm size affect herding
intensity.
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the diversity of a broad stock market index, we derive results for the average herding
intensity by solving the Avery and Zemsky (1998) herding model numerically for a wide
range of parameter values. The results of this simulation exercise can be summarized
by three testable hypotheses regarding the impact of market conditions on the degree
of herding. First, herding should increase in times of market turbulence, particularly
during the recent financial crisis. Second, herd behavior should decrease in times of a
sudden inflow of new public information, for example during the opening intervals of
financial markets. Third, and probably more surprising, the simulation suggests that
herding intensity should be small when signals are noisy, e.g. when financial analysts’
recommendations are disperse. Therefore, in contrast to the intuition of e.g. Patterson
and Sharma (2010) and Chiang and Zheng (2010), increased uncertainty does not
necessarily lead to increased herding.
Most herding models, including Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian
(2011), show that prices eventually converge to the fundamental values. In fact, our
simulation results confirm that prices converge rather quickly. This suggests that herd
behavior should be more of an intra-day phenomenon. Therefore, an empirical analysis
of herd behavior requires a fine-grade analysis of disaggregated investor-level data. Yet,
the literature on institutional herding has been handicapped by the unavailability of
appropriate data. The bulk of the empirical literature uses institutions’ changes in
quarterly holdings which cannot account for the short-term character of informational
cascades. Christoffersen and Tang (2010) and Patterson and Sharma (2010) analyze
herding with daily and intra-day data but they have to rely on anonymous transaction
data that does not allow to differentiate between traders.
The empirical part of the paper contributes to the literature by analyzing intra-day
investor-level data that directly identify transactions by each trader. The data are
provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and include
all real-time transactions in the major German stock index DAX 30 carried out by
banks and financial services institutions. The sample period runs from July 2006 to
March 2009 which allows us to measure herding before and after the outbreak of the
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financial crisis. We use the empirical herding measure proposed by Sias (2004) because
it differentiates between traders that indeed follow predecessors and traders that simply
follow themselves, for example, because they split their trades. To the best of our
knowledge, the Sias measure has not been applied to intra-day data before.2
Our empirical results confirm that transactions of financial institutions are correlated
within a trading day, i.e. herding measures are found to be significant. However, in light
of the theoretical predictions derived from the simulation exercise, the evidence does
not support herd behavior as a major explanation for the correlated trading activity
of institutional investors. First, we found only weak evidence for increased herding
intensity during the crisis period. Second, in contrast to theoretical predictions, herding
measures are significantly higher in the opening intervals and the afternoon session when
new information enters into the German market due to the opening of the U.S. market.
Third, herding intensity decreases only to a very small amount at days of high analyst
dispersion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the herding model and
the simulation setup used to derive testable hypotheses on the role of market conditions
for herding intensity. Section 3 and 4 introduce the data and the empirical herding
measure. Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Herding in Financial Markets
The large literature on the causes and consequences of informational cascades and
herd behavior was initiated by the seminal work of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and
Banerjee (1992).3 In Bikhchandani et al. (1992) agents choose whether to invest in
a project at fixed costs. Bayesian agents act sequentially and base their decision on
2In a companion paper, Kremer and Nautz (2012) use this data set to demonstrate how empirical
herding measures are affected by both the identification of traders and the underlying data frequency.
3For comprehensive surveys of the herding literature, see e.g. Chamley (2004), Hirshleifer and
Hong Teoh (2003) and Vives (2008).
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a private noisy signal and the observed behavior of their predecessors. Both sources
may present conflicting information. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) show that eventually
agents disregard their private signals, with a positive probability that agents herd on
the wrong side.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) adjust the basic herding model to the situation in financial
markets. In particular, they abandon the assumption of fixed costs and introduce a
market maker who incorporates all publicly available information in the prices. Inter-
estingly, in this setup herding disappears because it is always optimal to trade based on
private information. However, if the model is augmented by additional dimensions of
uncertainty beyond the value of the asset and information disadvantages for the market
maker, herding reemerges.4
Herding models emphasize the importance of uncertainty and asymmetric information
for the trading behavior in financial markets. Yet, herding models are not designed to
provide testable predictions about the effects of various aspects of uncertainty on the
degree of herding. In particular, from a theoretical perspective, it is far from obvious
how herding intensity should be affected by i) market turbulences, ii) the expected
arrival of new public information, or iii) the precision of private signals. In order
to shed more light on these questions, we perform numerical model simulations to
derive theory-guided predictions on the effects of market conditions on average herding
intensity for a wide range of parameter values. Simulations are based on the herding
model of Avery and Zemsky (1998) which provides an appealing way to parameterize
the market conditions under investigation.
2.1 The herding model of Avery and Zemsky
In the following, we briefly review the Avery and Zemsky (1998) herding model, in-
troduce the simulation setup and explain how certain model parameters can be linked
4Recently, Park and Sabourian (2011) showed that the distribution of signals plays an important
role for herding to arise. In particular, signals need to be U-shaped, such that traders put more weight
on the extremes of an asset’s possible values.
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to market conditions in the German stock exchange. In Avery and Zemsky (1998) a
stock can be characterized by the following four parameters: the probability of an infor-
mation event (α), the probability that a stock increases in value given an information
event (δ), the fraction of informed traders (µ), and the precision of an informed trader’s
signal (p).
The Asset: An asset with fundamental value V ∈ {0, 12 , 1} is traded over t = 1, . . . , T
consecutive points in time. The probability that V = 12 is 1 − α with α ∈ (0, 1).
Accordingly, the parameter α determines the probability of an information event.5 In
the following, we assume that α should be high at the opening intervals of financial
markets when a lot of new information arrives.6
Given that V 6= 12 , the probability that V = 1 is δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the larger δ, the
more optimistic is the market. Put differently, δ should be low during a financial crisis
period. Note that the model is symmetric in δ in the sense that herding intensity only
depends on ∆ = |δ − 12 |. In the simulation exercise, we therefore restrict the attention
to δ > 12 without loss of generality.
The Traders: Traders arrive one at a time in a random exogenous order in the
market and decide to buy, sell or not to trade one unit of the asset at the quoted bid
and ask prices. Traders are either informed or noise traders. The fraction of noise
traders is 1 − µ and they decide to buy, sell or not to trade with equal probability.
Thus, noise traders ignore any information and cannot herd by definition. Informed
traders receive a private signal S ∈ {0, 12 , 1} on the fundamental value of the asset and
observe all publicly available information, i.e. all trades and posted prices up to their
arrival. They decide to buy (sell) one unit of the asset if their expected value of the
asset conditioned on their information set is strictly greater (smaller) than the ask (bid)
5The concept of event uncertainty was first introduced by Easley and O’Hara (1987).
6Note that predictions related to the parameter α could not be derived within the framework of Park
and Sabourian (2011) since it does not allow to distinguish between information and non-information
events.
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price. Otherwise, informed traders choose not to trade. In our empirical application,
we assume that institutional investors are informed traders.
The Private Signal: The signal is drawn from a distribution conditioned on the
value of the asset, where Pr(S = v|V = v) = p ∈ (12 , 1) if v 6= 12 and Pr(S = 12 |V =
1
2) = 1. Accordingly, informed traders know whether V 6= 12 , i.e. whether an information
event occurred. In case of an information event, informed traders receive an imprecise
private signal about the value of the asset, i.e. whether V = 1 or V = 0. The parameter
p determines the precision of the signal: the larger p the more precise the signal. In
our empirical application, we will assume that the precision of signals correlates with
the distribution of the buy and sell recommendations of financial analysts.
The Market Maker: Trading takes place in interaction with a market maker who
sets the bid and ask price. The market maker accesses only the public information and
is subject to perfect competition such that he makes zero-expected profit. Thus, he
sets the ask (sell) price equal to its expected value of the asset given a buy (sell) order
and the public information.
2.2 The ambiguous effects of market conditions on herding intensity
Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that herd behavior can arise in this setup provided
that private signals are sufficiently imprecise. Specifically, Avery and Zemsky (1998)
derive an upper bound for the precision of traders’ signals, p, for which herd behavior
arises. Unfortunately, however, no general results are available that would provide
straightforward predictions on the effect of changes in model parameters on the degree
of herding. Let us illustrate this problem for the impact of variations in p, δ, and α.
In response to an increase in p, traders’ signals are more informative about the funda-
mental value of the asset and it seems less likely that traders’ decisions based on their
private signals are overturned by the public information. However, this intuition might
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be misleading because public information increases as each of the preceding trades by
informed traders carries more information. Therefore, the overall effect on the degree
of herding is not obvious. A similar reasoning applies to the probability of an informa-
tion event, α. On the one hand, if α decreases the market maker has stronger priors
that V = 12 . As a result, he will adjust prices more slowly into the direction of V = 0
or V = 1 with incoming buy or sell orders. In case of an actual information event
this gives the informed traders an advantage in interpreting the preceding trades. As
a consequence, herding is more likely to arise and long lasting. On the other hand, a
decrease in α means that information events happen less often. As a result, stocks will
experience less days where herd behavior could arise. Therefore, the overall effect of
changes in α on the degree of herding is also ambiguous. Finally, consider the effects
of an increase in ∆ = |δ − 12 |. On the one hand, an increase in ∆ reduces uncertainty
with respect to the value of the asset which should reduce the risk of herding. On the
other hand, however, an increase in ∆ also increases asymmetric information as the
information advantage of informed traders over the market maker increases. Therefore,
herding intensity may also increase.
Apparently, the effects of changes in a single model parameter on herding intensity
are non-monotonic and related to the level of the remaining model parameters. In
practice, the effect of, say, an increase in α may thus depend on the specific stock
under consideration. Since the empirical herding literature focusses on the average
amount of herding in a large and heterogenous stock market, theoretical predictions
for the overall effect of market conditions on herding intensity are not clear. In view
of these problems, we simulate the herding model for a broad range of parameters in
order to derive theory-guided predictions on the role of i) market turbulence (∆), ii)
the availability of public information (α) and iii) the precision of signals (p) for the
average degree of herding in a stock market.
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2.3 The simulation exercise
Consider a heterogenous stock market Ω = M × A×D × P , where each stock ωi ∈ Ω
is represented by the corresponding set of model parameters ωi = (µi, αi, δi, pi). In
the following simulation exercise, we assume that the fraction of informed traders in
stock i, µi, is taken from M = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6} which corresponds to the range
of market shares of institutional investors observed for our sample period. αi, the
probability of an information event relevant for stock i, varies between 0.1 and 0.9, i.e.
A = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} covering both low, medium, and high event probabilities.
δi, the probability of Vi = 1 given an information event, ranges according to D =
{0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95}, where the symmetry of the model around δ = 12 allows us
to focus on values of δ > 12 . Finally, pi, the precision of the private signal, also varies
according to P = {0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95}. In this case, restricting the attention to
probabilities above 0.5 is plausible because pi < 0.5 would imply that the signal is not
only imprecise but even misleading on average.
Simulating the corresponding probability distributions, each stock ωi = (µi, αi, δi, pi)
is traded over T = 50 periods. For each ωi, the simulation is repeated 2000 times.7
A trader engages in herd behavior if his action (buying or selling) corresponds to the
action of the majority of the past traders and is independent of his private signal.8
In empirical applications, it is difficult to decide whether a trader herds or not since
researchers have no access to private signals. In contrast, this is not a problem in our
simulation exercise where all model parameters are under control and the realizations
of private signals are observable. We define herding intensity in stock ωi as the fraction
of informed traders that engage in herd behavior over the total number of informed buy
7We also ran the simulations with 500 and 1000 repetitions which showed that the results are robust.
8The formal definition of buy herding implemented in the simulation is as follows: A trader engages
in buy herding at time t if and only if V 6= 1
2
, E[V |S = 0] ≤ askt, E[V |Ht, S] > askt ∀S = 0, 1
and E[V |Ht] > E[V ], where E[·] denotes the expectation operator, Ht denotes the history of trades,
i.e. all trades up to time t − 1, and askt is the ask price at time t. The definition of sell herding is
analogous. Note that our definition is slightly weaker than the definition of Avery and Zemsky (1998),
but more suitable for empirical applications. The matlab-codes for the model simulation are available
upon request.
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and sell decisions during the 50 trading periods.9 Accordingly, we obtain the degree of
herding in the whole market as the average over all stocks and all 2000 repetitions. Due
to the ambiguous effects of changes in p, α and δ on the degree of herding in the whole
market, we are particularly interested in how the average herding intensity depends on
these three parameters. Figure 1 to 3 summarize the simulation results obtained for
the average herding intensity. In line with Park and Sabourian (2011), our simulations
show that herding intensities predicted by the Avery and Zemsky (1998) model are
rather small.
Figure 1: The Effect of δ on Herding
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Notes: The figure plots the link between average herding intensity implied by the model of Avery
and Zemsky (1998) and δ, the probability that a stock increases in value given an information event.
Herding intensity in stock ωi is defined as the fraction of informed traders that engage in herd behavior
over the total number of informed buy and sell decisions during the 50 trading periods. For each δi,
averages are taken w.r.t. Ωi = M ×A× δi ×P . Low values for δ can be interpreted as times of market
distress. Due to symmetry, we display the results for ∆i = |δi − 12 |.
Figure 1 shows that increases in ∆ = |δ− 12 | tends to increase average herding intensity.
This implies that herding increases in turbulent times when the probability that a
stock either increases or decreases in value is very high. Provided that δ has decreased
significantly below 0.5 since the outbreak of the financial crisis, it follows:
9Note that during 50 trading periods 16 buy or sell orders come from informed traders on average.
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Figure 2: The Effect of α on Herding
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 10−3
α
H
er
di
ng
Notes: The figure plots the link between average herding intensity implied by the model of Avery
and Zemsky (1998) and α, the probability of an information event. Herding intensity in stock ωi
is defined as the fraction of informed traders that engage in herd behavior over the total number of
informed buy and sell decisions during the 50 trading periods. For each αj , averages are taken w.r.t.
Ωj = M × αj × D × P . We assume that α is particularly high at the opening intervals of financial
markets.
Hypothesis 1 (Herding in times of market turbulence). Average herding intensity
should have increased since the outbreak of the financial crisis.
Figure 2 shows that the average herding intensity decreases with the probability of an
information event α. While counteracting effects made general theoretical predictions
difficult, the simulation exercise clearly demonstrates that the average herding inten-
sity should be high if α, the inflow of new information, is low. Suppose that α, the
probability of an information event, increases in times of a sudden inflow of new public
information, e.g. at the opening intervals of financial markets. This leads us to the
following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (Herding at the market opening). Average herding intensity should be
particularly low at the opening intervals of financial markets.
In line with the non-monotonic effect of p on herding intensity, Figure 3 confirms that
the empirical relationship between herding intensity and the precision of signals is more
10
Figure 3: The Effect of p on Herding
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Notes: The figure plots the link between average herding intensity implied by the model of Avery and
Zemsky (1998) and p, that determines the precision of informed traders’ signals. Herding intensity
in stock ωi is defined as the fraction of informed traders that engage in herd behavior over the total
number of informed buy and sell decisions during the 50 trading periods. For each pk, averages are
taken w.r.t. Ωk = M × A × D × pk. We assume that the precision of signals correlates with the
distribution of analysts’ buy, sell and hold recommendations, p should be particularly low if analysts’
recommendations are disperse.
complicated. However, the simulation results suggest that herding intensity increases
in the precision of signals as long as p is neither extremely high nor extremely low.
Thus, one may expect that the average herding intensity decreases if the precision of
signals decreases. In practice, the information content of signals should correlate with
the dispersion of the recommendations of financial analysts. Specifically, if analysts’
dispersion is high, the precision of signals should be low and vice versa, compare Brown
et al. (2012) and Christoffersen and Tang (2010). This implies:
Hypothesis 3 (Herding and disagreement among financial analysts). Average herding
intensity should decrease when analysts’ recommendations become more disperse.
In the following section, we introduce the data set and the empirical herding measure
that we employ to analyze the empirical content of these hypotheses.
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3 The Data Set
The empirical part of the paper is based on disaggregated high-frequency investor-
level data covering all real-time transactions carried out in the German stock market in
shares included in the DAX 30, i.e., the index of the 30 largest and most liquid stocks.10
These records allow for the identification of all relevant trade characteristics, including
the trader (the institution). The information also include e.g. the particular stock,
time, number of traded shares, price, and the volume of the transaction. Moreover, the
records identify on whose behalf the trade was executed, i.e., whether the institution
traded for its own account or on behalf of a client that is not a financial institution.
Since the aim of our study is the investigation of institutional trades, particularly those
of financial institutions, we focus on the trading of own accounts, i.e., those cases when
a bank or a financial services institution is clearly the originator of the trade. We
exclude institutions trading exclusively for the purpose of market making. We also
exclude institutions that are formally mandated as designated sponsors, i.e., liquidity
providers, for a specific stock.11
The study covers data from July 2006 until March 2009, i.e. a total of 698 trading days.
Stocks were selected according to the index composition valid on March 31, 2009. Over
the observation period 1,044 institutions traded in DAX 30 stocks on German stock
exchanges. The market share of institutional investors during the observation period
varied between about 20% to 60%. In order to estimate intra-day empirical herding
measures, we divide each trading day into 18 intervals as displayed in Table 1. The
opening period (9.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m.) of the trading platform Xetra, where the
bulk of trades occur, is divided in 17 half-hour intervals. The rest of the trading day
10The data are provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Under
Section 9 of the German Securities Trading Act, all credit institutions and financial services institutions
are required to report to BaFin any transaction in securities or derivatives which are admitted to trading
on an organized market. In a companion paper, Kremer and Nautz (2012) use this data to show the
impact of data-frequency on herding levels by comparing quarterly, monthly and daily calculations.
11For each stock, there are usually about two institutions formally mandated as market maker. The
institutions are not completely dropped from the sample (unless they are already dropped due to purely
engaging in market maker business), but only for those stocks for which they act as designated sponsors.
The designated sponsors for each stock are published at www.deutsche-boerse.com.
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Table 1: Trading Activity of Institutional Investors in the German Stock Market
Average Number Average Share
Interval Number Time Period of Traders of Trading Volume
1 09:00 - 09:30 25.33 6.73
2 09:30 - 10:00 21.05 5.34
3 10:00 - 10:30 15.75 2.57
4 10:30 - 11:00 22.88 6.73
5 11:00 - 11:30 19.58 4.51
6 11:30 - 12:00 18.72 4.15
7 12:00 - 12:30 17.96 3.77
8 12:30 - 01:00 17.08 3.39
9 01:00 - 01:30 17.36 4.31
10 01:30 - 02:00 16.57 3.28
11 02:00 - 02:30 17.85 3.96
12 02:30 - 03:00 18.90 4.63
13 03:00 - 03:30 18.32 4.42
14 03:30 - 04:00 20.42 6.43
15 04:00 - 04:30 20.70 6.98
16 04:30 - 05:00 20.74 7.64
17 05:00 - 05:30 22.50 10.13
18 05:30 - 08:00 18.20 10.91
Notes: This table shows the division of the trading day in 18 half-hour intervals. The
opening period for the German stock exchanges at the floor is from 9 a.m. until 8
p.m. CET. On the trading platform Xetra R©, on which the great majority of trades
and volumes occur, trading takes place from 9 a.m. till 5.30 p.m. CET. The interval
number 18 is therefore enlarged. The third column of the table reports the average of
the number of traders active in each interval over the whole observation period and over
all stock. The fourth column of the table reports the mean allocation of the trading
volume of traders over the time intervals in percentage terms. The values are calculated
as fraction of institutions trading volume in one interval according to institutions trading
volume at the complete trading day and then averaged over all days and all stocks.
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(5.30 p.m. to 8.00 p.m.) is summarized to a final 18th period in order to ensure that
there are always enough active institutions to perform an intra-day analysis. Table
1 reports summary statistics on the evolution of the intra-day trading activity of in-
stitutional investors. While traders are particularly active at the opening (about 25)
and closing (22.5) intervals, the number of institutions trading appears to be rather
stable throughout the day. The highest trading volumes are typically observed at the
beginning (6.73%) and at the end of the day (about 10% of the institutional trading
volumes).12
4 The Empirical Herding Measure
The dynamic herding measure proposed by Sias (2004) is designed to explore whether
investors follow each others’ trades by examining the correlation between the traders
buyers tendency over time. Similar to the static herding measure proposed by Lakon-
ishok et al. (1992), the starting point of the Sias measure is the number of buyers as
a fraction of all traders. Specifically, consider a number of Nit institutions trading in
stock i at time t. Out of these Nit transactions, a number of bit are buy transactions.
The buyer ratio brit is then defined as brit = bitNit . According to Sias (2004), the ratio
is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance:
∆it =
brit − b¯rt
σ(brit)
, (1)
where σ(brit) is the cross sectional standard deviation of buyer ratios across i stocks at
time t. The Sias herding measure is based on the correlation between the standardized
buyer ratios in consecutive periods:
∆it = βt∆i,t−1 + it. (2)
The cross-sectional regression is estimated for each time t and then the time-series
average of the coefficients is calculated: β =
∑T
t=2 βt
T−1 .
12For sake of robustness, we also divided the trading day into 9 one-hour intervals but our main
results do not depend on this choice, see Table 5 in the Appendix.
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The Sias methodology further differentiates between investors who follow the trades
of others (i.e., true herding according to Sias (2004)) and those who follow their own
trades. For this purpose, the correlation is decomposed into two components:
β = ρ(∆it,∆i,t−1) =
[
1
(I − 1)σ(brit)σ(bri,t−1)
] I∑
i=1
[
Nit∑
n=1
(Dnit − b¯rt)(Dni,t−1 − b¯rt−1)
NitNi,t−1
]
+
[
1
(I − 1)σ(brit)σ(bri,t−1)
] I∑
i=1
Nit∑
n=1
Ni,t−1∑
m=1,m6=n
(Dnit − b¯rt)(Dmi,t−1 − b¯rt−1)
NitNi,t−1
 , (3)
where I is the number of stocks traded. Dnit is a dummy variable that equals one if
institution n is a buyer in i at time t and zero otherwise. Dmi,t−1 is a dummy variable
that equals one if trader m (who is different from trader n) is a buyer at time t − 1.
Therefore, the first part of the measure represents the component of the cross-sectional
inter-temporal correlation that results from institutions following their own strategies
when buying or selling the same stocks over adjacent time intervals. The second part
indicates the portion of correlation resulting from institutions following the trades of
others over adjacent time intervals. According to Sias (2004), a positive correlation
that results from institutions following other institutions, i.e., the latter part of the
decomposed correlation, can be regarded as evidence for herd behavior.
According to Choi and Sias (2009), Equation (3) can be further decomposed to dis-
tinguish between the correlations associated with ”buy herding” and ”sell herding”.
Hence, stocks are classified by whether institutions bought in t − 1 (bri,t−1 > 0.5) or
sold in t− 1 (bri,t−1 < 0.5).
5 Correlated Trading by Institutions: Empirical Results
5.1 Herding measures for the whole sample period
Table 2 displays the results obtained from the Sias herding measure for institutional
traders. To begin with, consider the rows presenting the herding measures calculated
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for the whole sample. The estimated correlation at intra-day frequency over the com-
plete period and over all stocks is 31.12% (i.e. βˆ = 0.3112), which is significantly higher
than the results obtained by Sias (2004) and Choi and Sias (2009) at quarterly, Puckett
and Yan (2008) for weekly and Kremer and Nautz (2012) at daily frequency.13 Decom-
posing the estimated coefficients into the two sources of the correlation shows that the
institutional investors follow their own strategies as well as those of others. However,
following Sias (2004), the average degree of true herding, defined as the tendency of
institutions to follow the trades of others, is only 10.57%. Similar findings are obtained
for the buy and sell herding measures, see panel 2 and 3 of the Table. In all cases,
the size of the adjustment in the correlation of trades confirms the importance of using
investor-level data for calculating empirical herding measures.14
5.2 Herding in times of market turbulence
According to Hypothesis 1, herding intensity should increase in times of market turbu-
lence, particularly during the recent financial crisis. In order to explore the empirical
relevance of this simulation-based model prediction, we calculated the herding measure
for the crisis and the pre-crisis period separately. The pre-crisis ends on August 9, 2007
as this is widely considered as the starting date of the financial crisis in Europe, see
European Central Bank (2007).
The herding measures obtained before and during the crisis are displayed in the second
and third row of Table 2. While the Sias measure is indeed significantly higher in
the crisis period (10.86 > 9.50), the difference is only small and does not appear to
be of economic relevance. Very similar conclusions can be drawn from the inspection
of herding measures conditioned on buy and sell trades (see lower panels of Table 2)
or from herding measures based on one-hour intervals, see Table 6 in the Appendix.
13The coefficients were estimated considering only intraday correlations and not the correlation be-
tween interval 18 and 1 at the next day. Including those correlation, the Sias measure slightly decreases
to 28.62%. For brevity, these results are not presented, but are available on request.
14Results for one-hour intervals reveal similarly a 31.26 % correlation. In that case 53% of the
correlation is dedicated to institutions following themselves. The results are displayed in Table 6 in the
Appendix.
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Table 2: Empirical Herding Measures - Overall, Before and During the Crisis
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Sample Period Own Trades Trades of Others
July 2006 - March 2009 31.12
(0.01)
20.55
(0.10)
10.57
(0.11)
Pre-crisis period 33.24
(0.01)
23.74
(0.11)
9.50
(0.14)
Crisis period 29.59
(0.01)
18.73
(0.11)
10.86
(0.13)
Buy Herding
July 2006 - March 2009 14.08
(0.23)
9.29
(0.14)
4.79
(0.11)
Pre-crisis period 14.37
(0.37)
10.27
(0.13)
4.10
(0.10)
Crisis period 13.87
(0.35)
8.78
(0.19)
5.09
(0.11)
Sell Herding
July 2006 - March 2009 17.02
(0.14)
11.24
(0.10)
5.78
(0.10)
Pre-crisis period 18.87
(0.23)
13.46
(0.11)
5.41
(0.09)
Crisis period 15.65
(0.25)
9.91
(0.12)
5.74
(0.08)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on half-hour
intervals. The correlations are displayed in percentage terms. The correlations were
first estimated with a cross-sectional regression for each time interval t and stocks i.
The reported correlations display the time-series average of the regression coefficients in
percentage terms. The second and third column report the partitioned correlations that
result from institutions following their own trades and institutions following the trades
of others, see Equation (3). In the lower parts of the table the correlation is partitioned
into those stocks institutions purchased in the previous time interval (buy herding) and
those institutions sold (sell herding). Standard errors are given in parentheses.
17
Overall, these findings provide only weak evidence for an increased herding intensity
during the crisis period.
5.3 Herding at market opening
According to Hypothesis 2, average herding intensity should be particularly low in times
of a sudden inflow of new information, particularly at the opening intervals of financial
markets. In order to investigate this prediction, we examine how the herding intensity
changes during the course of the trading day. To that aim, we calculate the Sias
herding measure for each half-hour time interval separately. The results of this exercise
are presented in Table 3. The third column shows the relevant correlation resulting
from institutions following other institutional trades. We find that this correlation is
relatively high (9.92%) at the opening interval of the German market. Moreover, the
peak of the correlation (12.86%) is found for the intervals between 3:30 and 4:30 p.m.
CET (intervals 14-15), when the U.S. market opens and a lot of new information flows
into the German market. Therefore, even without a formal test, there is clear evidence
against Hypothesis 2. This suggests that correlated trades of institutions should not
be misinterpreted as true herding. Apparently, significant herding measures point to
unintentional or spurious herding, where trades of institutions are correlated because
they trade upon correlated information, see e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001).
5.4 Herding and disagreement among financial analysts
Let us now consider the evidence for the third hypothesis derived from the model simu-
lation. Following Hypothesis 3, the average herding intensity should be particulary low
when analysts’ recommendations are more disperse. In order to investigate the empir-
ical content of this prediction, we collect daily data from Bloomberg indicating ”Buy”,
”Hold” and ”Sell” recommendations of financial analysts for specific stocks. Having
assigned the numerical values 1, 3 and 5 accordingly, dispersion in recommendations of
financial analysts is measured consistent with Brown et al. (2012) as standard deviation
of all outstanding recommendations each day. Tertiles of the dispersion data is used
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Table 3: Empirical Herding Measures Throughout the Trading Day
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Time Interval Own Trades Trades of Others
9:30 - 10:00 25.92
(0.23)
16.00
(0.31)
9.92
(0.26)
10:00 - 10:30 28.59
(0.22)
21.05
(0.32)
7.54
(0.24)
10:30 - 11:00 30.43
(0.29)
22.58
(0.34)
7.85
(0.23)
11:00 - 11:30 34.30
(0.31)
24.32
(0.38)
9.98
(0.22)
11:30 - 12:00 33.98
(0.29)
25.74
(0.37)
8.24
(0.23)
12:00 - 12:30 33.91
(0.30)
26.08
(0.34)
7.83
(0.24)
12:30 - 01:00 33.81
(0.25)
26.85
(0.32)
6.96
(0.21)
01:00 - 01:30 33.28
(0.24)
25.44
(0.32)
7.84
(0.21)
01:30 - 02:00 34.00
(0.28)
25.44
(0.31)
8.56
(0.21)
02:00 - 02:30 34.74
(0.25)
26.14
(0.31)
8.60
(0.26)
02:30 - 03:00 33.38
(0.24)
25.09
(0.34)
8.29
(0.26)
03:00 - 03:30 34.21
(0.26)
24.90
(0.43)
9.31
(0.26)
03:30 - 04:00 34.19
(0.28)
23.59
(0.35)
10.60
(0.26)
04:00 - 04:30 35.65
(0.28)
22.79
(0.32)
12.86
(0.26)
04:30 - 05:00 34.62
(0.27)
22.72
(0.36)
11.90
(0.26)
05:00 - 05:30 32.94
(0.28)
20.41
(0.41)
12.53
(0.26)
05:30 - 08:00 18.16
(0.21)
11.80
(0.31)
6.36
(0.26)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on half-hour in-
tervals and averaged for the specific half-hour intervals. The correlations are displayed
in percentage terms. The correlations where first estimated with a cross-sectional re-
gression for each time interval t and stocks i. The reported correlations display the
time-series average of the regression coefficients in percentage terms for the respective
intervals. The second and third column report the partitioned correlations that result
from institutions following their own trades and institutions follow the trades of others,
see Equation (3). Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 4: Empirical Herding Measures and the Dispersion of Analyst Recommendations
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Own Trades Trades of Others
Low Dispersion 29.39
(0.03)
15.86
(0.05)
13.53
(0.21)
Mid Dispersion 30.23
(0.02)
16.94
(0.05)
13.29
(0.24)
High Dispersion 28.49
(0.03)
16.68
(0.05)
11.81
(0.23)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on half-hour
intervals and averaged for the specific dispersion tertiles. The correlations are displayed
in percentage terms. See Table 2 for further information.
to classify each stock at each trading day as a stock with ”Low”, ”Mid” and ”High”
dispersion, respectively. In a second step, we calculate the intra-day herding measures
and estimate the average for each of the three different groups separately. The results
are presented in Table 4. In line with Hypothesis 3, the relevant herding measures
related to ”following other behavior” show that herding decreases with higher analyst
dispersion. In particular, the fraction of the correlation resulting from following other
traders, as displayed in column three, is lowest (11.81) for the stocks and days with
high dispersions. However, the economic significance of the effect on analyst dispersion
on the herding measure seems to be negligible.
6 Conclusion
Particularly in times of economic uncertainty, herd behavior is often viewed as a signif-
icant threat for the stability and efficiency of financial markets. However, herd models
are typically not designed to provide testable predictions about the effects of uncer-
tainty on herding intensity. For example, in the stylized financial market of Avery and
Zemsky (1998), the popular assumption that ’increased uncertainty leads to increased
20
herding’ does not hold for all parametrizations of the model. It seems that there is a
lack of a direct link between herding theory and empirical work regarding the effect of
various aspects of uncertainty on herding intensity. Moreover, the empirical herding
literature is severely hampered by data availability. Although herd behavior in financial
markets should be more of a short-term phenomenon, researchers are often forced to
base their estimates either on e.g. quarterly data or on high-frequent but anonymous
transaction data that does not allow to identify the trader.
With a view to these problems, the contribution of our paper is aimed to be twofold.
First, we perform numerical simulations of the herding model of Avery and Zemsky
(1998) and derive three testable predictions. The simulation results show that herd-
ing intensity should be particularly high in times of market turbulence (1). Whereas
herding intensity should be particularly low both, at the opening intervals of financial
markets (2) and when analysts’ recommendations are disperse (3). Second, our em-
pirical analysis to investigate these hypothesis is based on a novel and comprehensive
high-frequent data set of the German stock market.
Our empirical results show that herding of institutional investors can hardly serve as
a major explanation for the observed correlation of trades. In particular, correlated
trading of institutional investors did not increase dramatically since the outbreak of
the financial crisis (1). In the same vein, we found that herding intensity is only
slightly lower when analysts recommendations for a certain stock are disperse (3). The
results obtained for Hypothesis (2) are particularly revealing: in sharp contrast to the
prediction of the herd model, we found that herding measures are significantly higher
(not lower) in the opening intervals and the afternoon session when new information
enters into the German stock market due to the opening of the U.S. market. This
strongly suggests that the observed correlation of trades is mainly due to the common
reaction of investors to new public information and should not be misinterpreted as
herd behavior.
Since the seminal contributions of Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004), empirical
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herding measures have been based on the correlation of trading pattern for a particular
group of traders and their tendency to buy and sell the same set of stocks. However, as
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) already emphasized, this implies that the theoretical
discussion of herd behavior and the empirical specifications used to test for herding are
only loosely connected. The weak support for herd behavior of institutional investors
found in this paper may raise further doubts about the appropriateness of prevailing
empirical herding measures.
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A Appendix
Table 5: Intra-Day One-Hour Intervals
Average Number Average Share
Interval Number Time Period of Traders of Trading Volume
1 09:00 - 10:00 30.32 12.07
2 10:00 - 11:00 25.72 9.30
3 11:00 - 12:00 24.76 8.66
4 12:00 - 01:00 22.67 7.16
5 01:00 - 02:00 22.07 7.59
6 02:00 - 03:00 23.60 8.58
7 03:00 - 04:00 24.87 10.85
8 04:00 - 05:00 26.20 14.63
9 05:00 - 08:00 28.11 21.24
Notes: This table shows the division of the trading day in 9 intervals. The opening
period for the German stock exchanges at the floor is from 9 a.m. until 8 p.m. CET.
On the trading platform Xetra R©, on which the great majority of trades and volumes
occur, trading takes place from 9 a.m. till 5.30 p.m. CET. The interval number 9 is
therefore enlarged. See Table 1 for further information.
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Table 6: Correlations of Trades - One-Hour - Overall, Before and During the Crisis
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Own Trades Trades of Others
Whole sample 31.26
(0.12)
16.51
(0.21)
14.75
(0.21)
<08/09/07 32.97
(0.04)
18.30
(0.19)
14.67
(0.24)
≥08/09/07 30.08
(0.03)
15.27
(0.14)
14.81
(0.23)
Buy Herding
Whole sample 14.30
(0.23)
7.55
(0.14)
6.75
(0.15)
<08/09/07 14.56
(0.37)
8.03
(0.13)
6.53
(0.15)
≥08/09/07 14.18
(0.35)
7.21
(0.19)
6.97
(0.15)
Sell Herding
Whole sample 16.96
(0.24)
8.96
(0.20)
8.01
(0.12)
<08/09/07 18.41
(0.33)
10.27
(0.19)
8.14
(0.12)
≥08/09/07 15.90
(0.35)
8.07
(0.18)
7.83
(0.13)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on one-hour
intervals. The correlations are displayed in percentage terms. See Table 2 for further
information.
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Table 7: Correlations of Trades - Intra-Day One-Hour Intervals
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Own Trades Trades of Others
1-2 28.21
(0.28)
14.16
(0.21)
14.05
(0.26)
2-3 33.57
(0.32)
19.38
(0.22)
14.19
(0.24)
3-4 33.65
(0.29)
21.02
(0.24)
12.63
(0.23)
4-5 33.02
(0.31)
21.13
(0.28)
11.89
(0.22)
5-6 33.25
(0.29)
20.41
(0.27)
12.84
(0.23)
6-7 33.50
(0.30)
19.69
(0.24)
13.81
(0.24)
7-8 33.15
(0.25)
17.45
(0.22)
15.70
(0.21)
8-9 21.80
(0.25)
13.50
(0.22)
8.30
(0.21)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on one-hour inter-
vals and averaged for the specific intervals. The correlations are displayed in percentage
terms. The correlations were first estimated with a cross-sectional regression for each
time interval t and stocks i. See Table 3 for further information.
Table 8: Correlations of Trades - One-Hour - Dispersion of Opinions
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation
Follow Follow
Own Trades Trades of Others
Low Dispersion 29.85
(0.03)
13.14
(0.21)
16.71
(0.21)
Mid Dispersion 30.94
(0.04)
14.28
(0.19)
16.66
(0.24)
High Dispersion 29.40
(0.03)
14.93
(0.14)
14.47
(0.23)
Notes: This table reports results of the Sias measure calculated based on one-hour
intervals and averaged for the specific dispersion tertiles. The correlations are displayed
in percentage terms. See Table 2 for further information.
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